(a) the provision by CMs that decisions regarding their implementation will be adopted by majority rule, or that any State concerned will abstain from participating in the decision, or that these decisions are not matters of substance (hence not requiring consensus), as envisaged by Article XII.2 of the Convention;

(b) in accordance with Article XIII.6 of the Convention, CCAMLR creating, as a subsidiary body, a panel composed of independent experts to deal with the determination of factual matters, such as compliance with a CM, i.e. the inclusion of a vessel on the IUU vessel list¹. The decision of such a panel would be binding. Another possibility that the Commission could consider is that panel decisions would be binding unless a negative consensus is reached subsequently by CCAMLR. This procedure would follow the example of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, which allows the political body (DSB) to cast a decision of the Appellate Body in the last resort². This means that a panel decision on the interpretation or the application of a CM would be binding, provided that CCAMLR does not decide by consensus not to accept it. This system has the advantage of been quasi-judicial, in the sense that the decision by the impartial organ will generally be binding, but it would nevertheless still give the political organ (the Commission) the ability – which would likely be exceptional – to decide otherwise in the last resort. This would only be the case if the circumstances demanded it; even then consensus would be required.